MEDIA LITERACY

Nonresponse Bias: Right on Party ID, Off by 38 Points on Neighbors

The same 2016 phone poll, at a 9% response rate, matched party-ID benchmarks within 1.5 points and missed a question about neighbors by 38 points.

LAST UPDATED 2026-08-18

Bar chart of Pew Research Center's 2017 benchmarking study. At a 9 percent response rate, phone poll estimates were off from high-response government benchmarks by about 1 point on religious affiliation, 1.5 points on party identification, 5 points on regular voting, 7 points on voter registration, 15 points on contacting an official, and 38 points on working with neighbors.

CORE SUMMARY

Nonresponse bias happens when the people who respond to a survey differ, in ways connected to the question itself, from the people who don't. It doesn't scale directly with the response rate. A 2017 Pew Research Center study benchmarked its phone polls, run at a 9% response rate in 2016, against 29 measures from high-response government surveys, including the Current Population Survey (87% response) and the General Social Survey (60%+ response, in-person). Party identification matched within about 1.4 to 1.6 percentage points and religious affiliation within about 1 point, both close to how the same comparison looked back when phone response rates were near 37% in 1996. But on civic-participation questions, the same low-response polls missed badly: reporting they'd worked with neighbors to fix a local problem was overstated by 38 points (46% versus 8%), and contacting an elected official by 15 points (25% versus 10%). A 2006 meta-analysis of 59 studies by Robert Groves found response rate explains only about 11% of the variance in nonresponse bias across surveys. What predicts the bias is whether the decision to answer a survey correlates with the specific behavior being asked about, and a 2009 study found answering surveys is itself a mildly prosocial act tied to volunteering, which is why civic questions get hit hardest.

The short version

Nonresponse bias is what happens when the people who skip a survey are different, on the specific thing being asked, from the people who answer it. It isn't the same as a survey simply having few respondents. A survey can run at a rock-bottom response rate and still land close to the truth, if answering it has nothing to do with the topic. It can also have a solid response rate and still be wrong, if the people who opt out lean hard one way on exactly the question being measured.

That distinction is easy to state and hard to believe until you see it inside one actual survey. Pew Research Center's telephone polls were running at a 9% response rate in 2016, low enough that plenty of people assumed the results couldn't be trusted on much of anything. When Pew checked those results against high-response government surveys question by question, some answers were dead-on. Others were off by dozens of points. Same poll, same response rate, wildly different accuracy depending on what was being asked.

The survey that got neighbors wrong by 38 points and party ID right

In 2017, Pew Research Center published its fourth study tracking what falling survey response had actually done to accuracy, following similar checks in 1997, 2003, and 2012. By 2016, its live-interviewer telephone polls were reaching a 9% response rate, down from 37% two decades earlier in 1996. To find out what that drop had cost, Pew compared 29 questions from its phone surveys against the same or nearly identical questions from surveys with far less nonresponse: the Current Population Survey (87% response) and the General Social Survey (60%+ response, conducted in person).

On some questions, the match was close. Party identification: Pew's 2016 phone polls found Democrats ahead of Republicans by 7 points; the high-response General Social Survey found Democrats ahead by 9 points, a gap of about 1.4 to 1.6 points depending on which party's share is compared. Religious affiliation: Pew found 23% of adults religiously unaffiliated in 2016, the GSS found 22%, a 1-point gap. Other questions drifted further. On voting in most local elections, 37% said yes on the phone versus 32% in the Current Population Survey, a 5-point overstatement. Voter registration: 63% in 2014 CPS data, 70% on the phone, a 7-point gap that Pew found was similarly sized back in 1996, when the phone response rate was still 37% rather than 9%. On civic participation, the same polls weren't close at all. The Current Population Survey found 8% of adults had worked with neighbors to fix a community problem in the past year. Pew's phone polls put that figure at 46%, a 38-point overstatement. Contacting an elected official: 10% in the CPS, 25% on the phone, a 15-point gap.

Bar chart of Pew Research Center's 2017 benchmarking study. At a 9 percent response rate, phone poll estimates were off from high-response government benchmarks by about 1 point on religious affiliation, 1.5 points on party identification, 5 points on regular voting, 7 points on voter registration, 15 points on contacting an official, and 38 points on working with neighbors.

Why response rate wasn't the variable that mattered

The obvious guess is that Pew's phone polls got worse across the board as fewer people picked up, and civic engagement just happened to be measured worse than party affiliation for some unrelated reason. The research points somewhere more specific: whether a question gets distorted by nonresponse depends on whether willingness to take the survey is itself correlated with the answer to that particular question, not with the overall response rate.

A 2009 study by Katharine Abraham, Sara Helms, and Stanley Presser, published in the American Journal of Sociology, traced the mechanism directly. They compared Current Population Survey respondents who went on to answer a separate follow-up survey against CPS respondents who skipped that follow-up, using the volunteering answers both groups had already given on the CPS itself. The respondents who continued on to the follow-up had reported more volunteer work on the earlier CPS than the ones who dropped out, evidence that agreeing to keep participating in surveys is a mildly prosocial act, correlated with the same underlying willingness to volunteer, contact officials, and get involved locally that the civic-engagement questions were trying to measure. That correlation inflates every civic-participation number specifically. It has no obvious reason to touch a question about which political party someone identifies with, which is why that number stayed close to accurate even as response collapsed.

This holds up at a larger scale, too. Robert Groves, a survey methodologist who later directed the U.S. Census Bureau from 2009 to 2012, published a 2006 meta-analysis in Public Opinion Quarterly pooling 59 separate studies that had directly measured nonresponse bias rather than just reporting response rate. Across those studies, response rate itself explained only about 11% of the variance in how much bias actually showed up. Some surveys under a 20% response rate had bias levels similar to surveys above 70%. It's the same shape of problem as a hidden factor deciding who ends up on each side of a comparison before anyone runs the numbers: the response rate is the figure everyone can see, but it isn't the figure doing the damage.

The 1936 poll that named the wrong president

The starkest historical case predates Groves and Pew by seven decades. In 1936, The Literary Digest, a general-interest magazine that had correctly called every U.S. presidential election since 1916 using the same straw-poll method, mailed 10 million ballots to a list built from telephone directories, car registrations, and its own subscriber rolls. About 2.4 million people mailed a ballot back, a 24% response rate on an enormous sample. The Digest predicted Alf Landon would beat incumbent Franklin Roosevelt, 57% to 43%. Roosevelt won, 62% to 38%, one of the largest misses in the history of American polling.

The standard explanation blames the mailing list: telephones and cars skewed toward wealthier households in 1936, who leaned more Republican than the country as a whole. Political scientist Peverill Squire re-examined the failure in a 1988 Public Opinion Quarterly paper, using a follow-up 1937 Gallup survey that had separately asked people whether they'd been polled by the Digest and how they'd voted. Squire found the mailing list's skew alone wasn't enough to explain a result that far off. Landon supporters who received a ballot were also more likely to mail it back than Roosevelt supporters who received one, adding a second, independent layer of nonresponse bias on top of the flawed sample. Squire's calculation: if everyone who received a ballot had actually returned it, the Digest's already-skewed sample would still have called the right winner. The extra miss came specifically from who chose to respond.

How to actually check for it

A stated response rate on its own says almost nothing about whether a specific number is trustworthy. What's worth asking instead: does answering this particular survey plausibly correlate with the answer to this particular question? A poll about a hobby is likely to overrepresent people who care enough about that hobby to spend ten minutes on a survey about it. A poll about which brand of dish soap someone buys has a much less obvious connection to who bothers to answer the phone.

Second, look for whether the pollster checked, rather than assumed. Pew's 2016-2017 study is worth trusting specifically because it benchmarked its own numbers against independent, high-response surveys and reported where it was wrong, including the 38-point miss, rather than only publicizing the parts that held up. The same self-selection logic shows up outside polling too, in who chooses to enter a given pool in the first place rather than getting randomly assigned to it: a group that opts in is rarely a representative slice of the population it's drawn from.

Third, be specific about what a low response rate is actually doing in the sentence you're reading. A number repeated with total confidence isn't the same thing as a number whose precision has actually been checked against something outside itself, and "the response rate was only 9%" does a lot of work in headlines that never mention whether anyone benchmarked the result against anything. The response rate is the easy number to report. Whether it correlates with the topic being measured is the number that actually decides whether to trust the result.

Frequently asked questions

What is nonresponse bias, in plain terms?

It's the error that shows up in a survey when the people who don't respond differ, in a way connected to the specific question being asked, from the people who do respond. That's different from random sampling error, which comes from chance rather than a systematic difference between respondents and nonrespondents.

Does a low response rate automatically mean a survey is biased?

No. A 2006 meta-analysis of 59 studies by Robert Groves found response rate explains only about 11% of the variance in actual nonresponse bias. Pew Research's 2016 phone polls, run at a 9% response rate, matched high-response government benchmarks on party identification within about 1.5 percentage points, while missing a question about working with neighbors by 38 points, the same survey and the same response rate producing wildly different accuracy depending on the topic.

Why did nonresponse bias hit civic-engagement questions so much harder than political ones?

A 2009 study by Abraham, Helms, and Presser found that agreeing to take a survey is itself a mildly prosocial act correlated with the same underlying willingness to volunteer or get involved locally that civic-engagement questions ask about. That correlation inflates civic numbers specifically. It has no obvious link to party identification, which is why that number stayed accurate even as phone response rates fell from 37% in 1996 to 9% in 2016.

What actually happened with the 1936 Literary Digest poll?

The magazine mailed 10 million ballots and got back about 2.4 million, a 24% response rate, then predicted Alf Landon would beat Franklin Roosevelt 57% to 43%. Roosevelt won 62% to 38%. A 1988 re-analysis by political scientist Peverill Squire found that beyond the mailing list's skew toward wealthier, more Republican households, Landon supporters who received a ballot were also more likely to actually return it than Roosevelt supporters were, adding a second layer of nonresponse bias on top of the flawed sample.

How is nonresponse bias different from a confounding variable?

A confounding variable distorts a comparison because a third factor is correlated with both sides of it, like stone size in a 1986 study that made one kidney stone treatment look better than it was. Nonresponse bias distorts a survey specifically because the decision to respond is correlated with the answer being measured. Both hide a real cause behind what looks like a straightforward number, but nonresponse bias is specific to who chose to participate rather than a third variable acting on a comparison already in progress.

How can you tell whether a specific survey result might be affected by nonresponse bias?

Ask whether answering that particular survey plausibly correlates with the specific thing being measured, not just how low the response rate was. Then check whether the source benchmarked its numbers against an independent, high-response survey rather than only reporting the response rate on its own. Pew's own study is a rare example of a pollster publishing where its numbers were wrong, not just where they held up.

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Written and edited by the Hollowvane Editorial Team